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 The paper deals with some experiences as gathered from our 
research in the area of the European Integration within the EU in general 
and with the current handling of the ongoing global economic and financial 
crisis in particular. That in addition to various other negative impacts on the 
Internal market of the EU has brought with itself also a direct thread to the 
very existence  of its common currency Euro and the entire Eurozone and 
finally also the EU itself. The paper in more details presents some of the 
main reasons for these negative development and impact on Euro. It 
analyses some of the  hectic and unsystematic reactions and  measures as 
taken by the EU institutions in order to save its common currency from a 
total collapse and/or its splitting into two “sub-currencies” as a stronger 
north and weaker south Euro currencies, Eurozone extra “government”, etc. 
That all after the decade long total ignorance of the Maastricht Treaty and 
its convergence criteria for the common currency. If its criteria have been 
observed strictly by all Euro zone members including of course also by 
Germany and France and/or otherwise all being penalized including those 
latter ones by the EU institutions there would be no such a deep crisis of 
Euro as it has been going on for already more than seven  years.       
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Some key background information on reasons why especially Euro has 
been so  negatively effected by the  global economic and financial crisis 
 In this respect it is important to realize that the entire process of 
preparation and implementation of Euro has been a long term process that 
has originally started as an integral  part of the process of the development of 
the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In view of this 
relatively complicated inception of Euro as a common EU currency it is 
important to take into account that the first initial steps  towards future 
common currency have been laid down by the so-called Werner Plan yet in 
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1971 in order to overcome at that time threatening currency crisis that led to  
abolition of until that time existing a system of stable exchange rates among 
major world currencies. As a result, finally a ECU – European Currency Unit 
was introduced as a special currency unit that was not existing as a real 
currency but was serving as a kind of some financial and accounting and 
non-cash unit. However, only after 17 years  in 1988 the European Council 
has adopted a strategy of gradual introduction of a true and real common 
European currency within the framework of the Economic and Monetary 
Union and on the basis of the so-called Delors’ Report in three relatively 
independent stages: 
 1) This first stage  of 1 July 1990 – 31 December 1993  was marked 
by  an abolition of any limitations on the free movement of capital within the 
EU. During this period on 7 February 1992  also the so-called Maastricht 
Treaty on the European Union has been signed that among others adopted 
also the famous Maastricht convergence criteria that are serving as the basic 
criteria for EU member states to become eligible for entering into the 
European common currency that at that time had not yet had its official 
name.  
 2) Again with some delay the second stage 1 January 1994  - 31 
December 1998  has introduced some institutional provision for the future 
common currency viz. the EMI - European Monetary Institute. During this 
stage also the name of the future common currency i.e. Euro has been 
approved in December 1995. After another year in December 1996, the 
design of future Euro banknotes and coins has been approved and in June 
1997 the so-called Stability and Growth Pact has been adopted as the 
necessary precondition for adoption of the future common currency.  
 However, the most important outcome of this stage has been the 
decision made by the Council of the EU that on the 2nd May 1998 has - 
although unanimously - adopted for the fate of the future Euro a rather 
controversial decision that altogether 11 EU member states are “meeting” the 
Maastricht convergence criteria and thus they are eligible for adoption of 
Euro since 1 January 1999. With the  effect of 1 June 1998 the EMI has been 
replaced by the ECB – European Central Bank as the central institution being 
responsible for Euro as the new EU common currency. 
 3) The third,  last and the most important stage in Euro preparations 
and implementation started on 1 January 1999. On that date, the mutual 
exchange rate system among the particular currencies has been unchangeably 
fixed up. What as it has been proved later was not the most favourable 
decision for the new common currency as it has thus fixed up also some 
differences in economics of the member states and thus  putting some of 
them into somehow permanent disadvantageous position.  Since that date, 
also the Euro has become the official “common” currency of the EU for 12 
European Scientific Journal October 2015 /SPECIAL/ edition Vol.1   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
81 
EU member states that  adopted the new common currency Euro on 1 
January 2002. On that date also again by a certain paradox  - with the  three 
years delay after the date when the Euro has become the official currency of 
the EU -  also the new Euro banknotes and coins have been put into real 
circulation and practical utilization.  
 
Summary of some main problems and weaknesses of the  Euro 
preparation and implementation that made it so volatile vis-a-vis the 
current global crisis 
 In a brief summary, the main problems and weaknesses of Euro due 
to its above complex and long  preparation and many  surrounding 
controversies  have been as follows. 
 The entire process of preparation and implementation of Euro as a 
common currency has been too long lasting for more than 30 years since 
inception of the Werner Plan so the momentum of the new currency has been 
during those years to some extent lost especially as far as the citizens of the 
EU are concerned with a quite natural question – if it is so complex and 
complicated and with so many compromises what is it all good for 
 In spite of such a long preparation, one of the biggest systems 
shortcomings of the new common currency has been the fact that due to 
above longevity and complexity of its inception, it has been prepared only as 
a special currency in the form of common banknotes and semi-common 
coins but  without any harmonization in the fiscal and other related policies. 
So from the very beginning it was only a common currency in circulation but 
not in any of at least elementary fiscal especially taxation common policy. 
Due to this fact the Euro in different member states countries has  very 
different “value” so to achieve one of its main objectives i.e. mutual 
comparability of prices in different countries is absolutely impossible 
 Another important negative aspect of the new currency has been an 
unclear and confusing institutional provision and responsibility for the new 
currency. In addition to the ECB – European Central Bank as the main 
regulating and control authority for Euro it is also the shared responsibility of 
all central banks in all Euro-zone member states what in practice means that 
there is a natural space for  a kind of irresponsibility in taking a due care for 
their common currency. This inconsistency  has come up and been 
manifested in full only since the beginning of  this crises when all countries 
instead of their common approach to protect Euro started mainly to protect  
their own national interests  through various national “initiatives” like e.g. a 
“scraping car bonus”, etc. And it has been so since the very beginning of 
Euro although not so much demonstrated as after the outbreak of the crisis.  
Otherwise it could not happen that the catastrophic situation with public 
finances in Greece has been “discovered” only after more than 10 years since 
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introduction of the Euro as a common currency and after “permanent and 
systematic ” monitoring of the Maastricht criteria strict observance  . And 
this is not only the grave mistake and irresponsibility of the ECB but also all 
other institutions that are responsible and/or co-responsible for controlling 
macroeconomic performance and  in particular Maastricht criteria like it is in 
case of the European Commission but also the Eurostat and to some extent 
also the European Parliament,       
 The Maastricht Treaty has had at least on  “paper” very demanding, 
strict and obligatory so-called Treaty obligations i.e. criteria to be met not 
only by applicant countries in order they could become eligible for becoming 
the Euro club and/or the Euro Zone  members but also by permanently by all 
Euro zone members. In failing to do so it has been possible to punish the 
particular country by adequate fines as applied towards violators of any part 
of the treaty or any other part of the EU legislation.  But unfortunately from 
the very beginning the interpretation of the Maastricht criteria in practice and 
requirements for their permanent observation has been very controversial, 
full of double standards etc. What finally led to the current deep crisis of 
Euro not because the global crisis but mainly due its internal controversies 
we have just presented. 
 
The disrespect for the Maastricht criteria – originally only two-three 
countries met them in full - as one of the main reasons for the current 
critical situation with Euro and/or where was the European Commission 
for ten years of this disrespect as a guarantor of the basic treaties or the 
ECB as a guarantor of Euro…? 
 As mentioned in the end of the previous part, one of the main 
deficiencies of Euro as a new common currency of the EU has - in addition 
to some others as described above - been not a very systematic handling and 
application of the so-called Maastricht convergence criteria. As the key 
selection criteria on eligibility or non-eligibility of the applicant country for 
joining the Euro Zone they were supposed to play the key role in selecting 
future Euro Zone countries and also in achieving a permanent stability and 
strength of Euro . Basically, those criteria as the Treaty duties and 
obligations should not allow any different interpretation and/or derogations 
in case of the Euro zone applicant countries. 
 Finally, the following specific convergence criteria (in addition to 
some more general criteria on macroeconomic stability, etc.) have been 
adopted and have become a part of the Maastricht Treaty: 
- the price stability and/or inflation – not more than 1.5% above the 
level of three best performing EU member states 
- the state budget and/or government deficit – not exceeding 3% of the 
GDP 
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- the ratio of total government debt to the GDP shall not exceed 60%  
- the interest rate should not exceed by more than 2% those of three 
best performing countries in the above inflation for at least one year before 
the examination 
- participation in the exchange-rate mechanism of the EMS for at least 
two years without any fluctuation above or bellow that mechanism. 
 As usual in the EU by a certain unwanted paradox, the biggest 
problems to meet these criteria had had also  those countries like Germany or 
France that were most demanding in their most tough and demanding 
formulation. In order to meet them, finally they had to resort to various 
(temporary) not-so-clear measures in order to pass through them and qualify 
themselves for becoming future Euro Zone members. Although it had to be 
clear for them that such their “successful finish” could not on a long term 
basis secure their non-problem participation in the Euro Zone as according to 
the Treaty terms all these criteria must be met on a permanent basis 
otherwise, the violating country will be severally punished by a high 
financial penalty to be paid for the entire period of non compliance.  
 Finally, in spite of all various measures often being on the threshold 
of unfairness, eleven EU member states “met” these criteria but… 
 The detailed analysis of their performance in the decisive period 
before the adoption of Euro  shows that in full these criteria were met only 
by 3 (three!?) out of “eligible” 11 EU member states: 
- France but it had also some big problems and needed some 
“innovative” solutions in revaluation of their gold reserves in order to meet 




 Again and certainly by a certain paradox we may see that among 
those three countries meeting the Maastricht criteria in full was missing also 
the country considered to be a main economic engine of the EU and the 
proponent of the most though formulation of these criteria!  
 It is evident that such a composition of three only member states – 
moreover two of them too small for being considered even as a 
representative sample or prototype of any future common currency - could 
not represent the first group of the users of the future EU “common” 
currency. Hence, in interpretation of individual criteria were finally and 
again as usual in the EU adopted such various supporting clauses existing in 
the Treaty as the last resort  that made them eligible in even cases that their 
total debt (on these criterion otherwise failed altogether 7 out of 11 “eligible” 
countries) exceeded the limit of 60% of the GDP by almost 100% and was 
hovering on the levels of around 120 % like in case of Italy and Belgium! 
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But could one imagine that the top representatives and thousands of well 
over paid EU bureaucrats  of the most important EU institutions stationed in 
Brussels would be paid in Belgian Franks instead in their ”own” new 
common currency – Euro?! 
 Hence, finally the selection of eligible countries was a process of 
various politically and otherwise motivated compromises that enabled to 
choose those 11 “eligible” countries that “met” Maastricht criteria or as one 
of “saving” clauses stated “demonstrated that any exceeding above the 
reference level was only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains 
close to the reference value …”.  
 With the difference of more than fifteen years since those 
“temporary… exceptional…close to be…” exceptions were used, we could 
state that most of them remain until now almost on the same high levels as 
when their were approved. What has changed it was the fact that some 
additional problems with other criteria have just appeared.  Hence for some 
time there was the strong general tendency to soften some criteria as they are 
too tough, rigid and as such “breaking” any sustainable economic 
development in the Euro Zone member states. These tendencies have 
intensified especially when also France and Germany started to have serious 
problems with keeping their budget deficits within the required limit of 3% 
of the GDP. As it was already problem of two main engines of the EU it is 
not surprising that finally not those two “EU engines” were punished by the 
severe financial penalties but… the particular criterion was… somehow 
softened exceptionally for them but not e.g. for new applicants for Euro from 
the NMS – New member states?! They have to meet original Maastricht 
criteria in full and on permanent basis. For example Lithuania was originally 
rejected from joining the Eurozone as it has not met the budget deficit by 
some fraction of percentage at the time when already most of the Eurozone 
members were in big recession and out of any Maastricht criteria?! Because 
in the EU we all are equal .. just some members are more equal! 
 In order to finish this part on some different application of the 
Maastricht criteria – otherwise typical approach in the EU - we dare to add 
only that: only Greece originally was used as an example that the EU 
authorities concerned were very consequent in demanding the meeting of the 
Maastricht criteria. Thus in this only case,  they clearly demonstrated that 
Maastricht criteria are not a rubber ones that could be somehow adjusted to 
any not properly performing countries.. Therefore,  later on,  Greece had to 
meet all criteria in full in order to become the 12th member of the first Euro 
group of states that introduced the “real” Euro on 1 January 2002, This 
Greece case is a  difference to some other much bigger states that even until 
now have not managed to reduce their enormous exceeding of their total 
debts as it is in the case of Italy or Belgium, but…Also now during the 
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critical situation with Euro mostly only Greece is singled out as an example 
of a country that has not been respecting its obligations towards Euro. As the 
only country  that has been carelessly manipulating with the indicators – but 
where were the EU institutions like the EC, the ECB or the Eurostat - on the 
Maastricht criteria and with other important macroeconomic indicators while 
some other countries not being much better than Greece like e.g. Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, but also Ireland are mostly not mentioned at all or only very  
marginally. Although for example according to the latest available statistics 
Italy has still very  high total debt of 132% of the GDP i.e. going up since 
being accepted for Eurozone with that clause on indicated positive 
development?!.. It means that in ten years Italy has  not managed not to 
reduce its total debt at all but it has been further growing. Although it has 
been accepted to the Euro zone on the basis that it has been showing a 
positive development in this respect?! But where has been  that positive 
development is not clear even until now! And of course it has to be taken 
into account that just 1% of the GDP of Italy is something completely 
different than in case of the tiny Greece, but... 
 Hence there is an immediate question where have been all those 
already mentioned regulatory and control institutions of the EU like the 
ECB, EC, EURSTAT, EP that they in 10 years have been unable to discover 
violators of Maastricht criteria not only in case of Greece but also all other?!  
But unfortunately also in the EU it is true that we all are equal but some are 
just more equal especially if you are big and strong enough country. 
 These and various other criteria and “criteria” for Euro are on the 
other hand in some sharp contrast with the real situation in using Euro, that 
in addition to the EU member states has already been used instead of 
national currency in numerous states that are not EU members and have not 
met any Maastricht or other criteria as e.g. it is in case of Monaco, Andorra, 
San Marino, Vatican (even with a special privilege to mint its own coins?!) 
and also some other countries that are even not EU neighbours like 
Montenegro or Kosovo in order to mention just Euro “users” in Europe. All 
these and some other cases have of course  nothing to do with any monetary 
or other common policy  of the EU, it is just a politics and towards a tourism 
business oriented tolerance if we realise that the set of Vatican coins with the 
face value of 3.88 Euro is possible to buy in the souvenir shop for only not 
less than 400-500 Euro?! Quite a good business isn’t it?!. However,  
definitely it is unfair and discriminatory towards the EU own especially new 
small  members that have to meet without any derogations all Maastricht 
criteria and prove also its sustainability while its own big members did not 
need that and the same also  those external states-users of Euro like e.g. 
Kosovo or Montenegro.  Although in some respects  they are bigger than 
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some of  the smallest Euro zone  member states  like Malta, Cyprus but also 
Slovenia.    
 
Current situation and problems  of Euro vis-a-vis its ongoing lethal  
crisis that could finally lead even to the demise of this “common” 
currency 
 After such a complicated and often controversial development, a 
careless regulatory and control mechanism from the side of the particular EU 
institutions led by the ECB and EC  it is no surprise that the Euro has been so 
negatively effected by the ongoing global economic and financial crisis. 
 At at the outset of the crisis there was existing quite an indifferent 
and critical only approach towards the Euro crisis that has been most 
dangerously presented in Greece. On one side especially from the side of 
Germany there was originally no intention to help Greece to get out from the 
crisis under the slogan that German workers would be not working till the 
age of 65 in order the Greeks could retire as before at the age of 55 with 
many extra benefits, perks, etc. There was forced an opinion that the EU is a 
market economy with the rules also for bankruptcy that should be applied not 
only in the case of unsuccessful companies but also of states. But soon after 
when it has been finally discovered or at least publically admitted that 
Greece is not the only member state of the Euro zone  on the verge of 
bankruptcy and that most of so-called “toxic” loans to Greece were quite 
logically from big German and French banks also the general strategy of the 
EU towards Greece has completely changed. 
 The saving Greece and thus also Euro and Eurozone has become a 
case of the EU “solidarity” and mutual help as it has been enshrined in the 
basic Treaties. It is pity that this kind of  the “solidarity” is applied only 
mostly in case when big members feel to be threatened and not also towards 
small new member states regarding e.g. a free movement of their citizens, for 
which we in the NMS had to wait for full seven years, the CAP – Common 
Agricultural Policy subsidies that are still in the NMS only about 60% of 
their much more richer old member states’ farmers, etc. And so on and so 
forth. 
 Finally after many heating debates at the never ending “summits” the 
EU leaders have come to the plan to save and help to Greece and to prevent 
anything similar in the future by adopting to main instruments in this respect 
i.e.: 
- A massive loans to Greece as an award for its own deadly reforms. 
Although nowadays after several years of these “reforms” the country is in 
much worse situation than it was when the these safety measures have been 
launched. It is generally agreed that the so-called “Troika” i.e. the European 
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Commission, the ECB and the IMF have just failed as it had to be clear to 
everybody who has some knowledge on macroeconomics but… 
- A so-called “Euro walls”  i.e.  large funds that in the future could be 
used immediately in similar cases to help  to any Euro member states in case 
of similar crisis. 
 But again it would not be the EU if again also this plan would not be 
creating some controversies. The first is that the sources for both of them 
were sought  not  where the problems were made but under the false and 
often otherwise overlooked principle of  “solidarity” it was sought within all 
members of the Euro zone and of course without any kind of direct 
accountability for this disastrous situation of Euro. Only in such a way could 
happen that e.g. for particular “Euro wall” the countries have to contribute by 
the following per cents of their GDP: 
- Slovakia 6.50%                                              -   Spain 4.81% 
- Germany 4.78%                                             -   Greece 5.16% 
- Luxemburgh 2.80%                                       -   Belgium 4.44% 
- Italy 5.02%                                                    -   France 4.60% 
 What is on these figures interesting it is several facts: 
- Slovakia that was at that time  the far poorest country in the Euro 
zone with only the GDP per capita 21,245 USD has had to contribute by the 
highest percentage of the GDP although it has been in the Euro zone only a 
little longer than one (!) year before the crisis  so much damage in this 
respect could not be made 
- Luxemburg as the richest member with the GDP per capita 78,395 
USD has allocation only 2.80% although it has been a founding member of 
the Euro zone and thus also directly co-responsible for the ignorance of the 
Maastricht criteria from the very start. Although it is also true that it is only 
one of 2-3 countries that really and fully met the Maastricht criteria from 
scratch  
- Even more interesting are the cases of those who on the long-term 
basis and from scratch have still been  violating the Maastricht criteria 
without any punishment so one would be expecting that at least in this case 
they would be allocated by a proportionally high contribution to this fund 
that to the large extent has to be created mainly due to their irresponsibility 
but... As we may see the contributions of Greece, Italy, Belgium, Spain as 
the main culprits in this respect but also France and Germany as the main 
architects of the Euro are only between 4.44 – 5.02%. By a certain paradox 
these limiting figures are of Belgium and Italy who for more than 10 years 
since inception of Euro have been permanently violating the total debt within 
the Maastricht criteria as it has been illustrated above on the case of Italy  
And of course they GDP per capita is between 29.109  in case of Italy to 
35.422 USD in case of Belgium. 
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 What is even more interesting, it is the fact there was taken no action 
in this respect towards the EU institutions that are paid by EU citizens/tax 
payers like the EC, EP, ECB, EUROSTAT etc. as they have  directly been 
responsible for controlling member states regarding their meeting of Treaties 
obligations and the EU legislation requirements in full and without any 
derogations. If this has been the case also regarding Euro and the Maastricht 
criteria there would not be needed any Euro wall and loans from the Euro 
zone member states! Such and really a huge Fund of collected fines from the 
violating member states would have been completely full after the ten years 
of irresponsible disrespect to the Maastricht criteria. But it could not be the 
case of the EU being infamous for its special interpretation of the Treaty 
duties, responsibilities, expected solidarity and generally applied “double 
standards”, etc. 
 As a result all above EU institutions have not been anyhow 
negatively effected by their irresponsible behaviour towards Euro. There 
have been taken no personal consequences towards e.g. the European 
Commission and it was  led for standard two terms by the same President 
whose first term in years 2004 – 2009 was the most important for successful 
implementation of Euro.  But as we demonstrated it was more about 
disastrous development of Eurozone  than anything else.  And it is absolutely 
true that  in this respect it has totally failed in protecting interests of the EU 
regarding its common currency what is its main Treaty obligation  The same 
is regarding the ECB. What consequences have been taken against its top 
executives that they let Euro to slide into such a deep crisis threatening the 
very existence of the Euro. And of course there have been so far no financial 
cuts to the budgets of these and all other EU institutions for their complete 
failure towards protecting Euro from its current crisis that is still not over 
and it really could happen what has been predicted by many experts that 
sooner or later the Euro could really demise          
  
Conclusion 
 In conclusion we could state that Euro even after more than thirty 
years of its preparation and more than decade since its introduction as a  
“common”  currency of the EU has not yet become for various reasons truly 
and fully a  real common currency for all its current 28 member states and its 
citizens and now it is almost impossible to image any massive enlargement 
of the Euro zone at all. On the other hand as a consequence also of this its 
internal position, Euro has not yet become an international currency that 
would be on par with its main competitor on international markets i.e. the 
US$. It will need many more years and mainly more systematic and 
consequent policies and not only monetary to make  Euro what it has 
originally been intended i.e. a common EU and internationally highly 
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recognized currency. The current Euro crisis as we have at least partially 
presented it in the previous parts of this paper has definitely not contributed 
to the respect, prestige and confidence towards this very special “common” 
currency. It is really a question what will be its future development, 
“enlargement” and position in the world. It is more than clear that not only 
Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Cyprus, etc. have not  definitely  
beent the last countries that have been so negatively effected by the current 
Euro crisis. There are many more EU countries as potential candidates to 
follow their problems and to extend the original PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, 
Greece, Spain ) to current PIIGSC i.e. adding Italy and Cyprus. It could be 
very soon PIIGSCB and it could also be F for France  in connection with its 
ranking  and so on and so forth. And that is already more than a half of the 
current Euro zone. And there exist even an opinion of many experts that 
perhaps there will if not a total demise of Euro as a common currency then at 
least its split into two categories, or ejection of some members like Greece 
that has already been on the verge of the total bankruptcy,  etc. It is simply 
just not possible to ignore own criteria for so many years  and hope that 
somehow it will be settled down. Especially the European Commission 
should be in this respect more self-critical and drawn its own lesson from 
this Euro crisis. On the other hand from the Eurozone member states it is 
also required more discipline and self-criticism and mainly responsibility. 
Especially its big and  strongest members should be very active not only in 
searching ways and means how to save their biggest banks that have made 
bad loans in Greece in billions and billions of Euro but also in their ability to 
respect by themselves initiated various criteria, safety walls, debt limits, etc. 
The latest developments clearly shows that although the so-called debt-break 
of 60% of the total debt of the Eurozone members has not yet been even 
implemented in full, there are already rumours that some of its initiators are 
already asking for postponing deadline for reaching that debt ceiling?! The 
biggest paradox is that it is absolutely nothing new as already in the 
Maastricht treaty that introduced Euro legally yet in 1992 it has been clearly 
stated that the countries that want join the Euro zone have to have the total 
debt not more than 60% of the GDP! And that was already more than 20 
years ago and as we know the basic treaties and thus also the Maastricht one 
is in the conditions of the EU a case of its surrogate constitution?! Hence, 
why we have needed to introduce now during  the lethal crisis the same just 
under the new name of the debt brake, etc.?! And finally there is just one 
single question. What system is it if such a really tiny country like Greece 
with its population of only about 2 - we repeat two - per cent of the total EU 
population could so lethally threaten such a giant like the EU with its over 
500 million citizens?!  . 
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